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THE INVESTMENT INJURY REQUIREMENT IN CIVIL
RICO SECTION 1962(A) ACTIONS
'INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO" or
"Act")' is a federal statute that punishes certain activities related to a pattern
of racketeering.2 RICO specifically prohibits four types of racketeering-related
activities8 and provides both criminal penalties4 and civil remedies5 for a viola-
tion of those prohibitions.
Among other proscriptions, RICO prohibits a person who has received in-
come from a pattern of racketeering activity from using or investing that in-
come to acquire an interest in an enterprise.' Among other remedies, RICO
allows private parties injured by a violation of RICO to sue in a civil action
for treble damages and attorneys' fees.'
Recently, an interpretive issue concerning the interplay8 between the use or
investment prohibition and the private civil remedy has split the federal appel-
late courts. Because this issue arises out of the language of the statute, a state-
ment of the issue is meaningless without reading the language of these two
sections.
The investment prohibition provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received income derived ...
from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use or invest . . . any part of
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in
...interstate or foreign commerce.9
The civil recovery provision provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 ... may sue ... in any appropriate United States district court
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). RICO was part of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub L. No. 91-452, Title IX, 84 Stat. 941.
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962; see also infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (discussing the
nature of a RICO pattern of racketeering).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
4. Id. § 1963.
5. Id. § 1964.
6. Id. § 1962(a).
7. Id. § 1964(c).
8. The phrase "interplay between sections 1962(a) and 1964(c)," which perfectly describes the
relevant interpretation process, must be credited to the Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 42,
Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 89-7668).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
475
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."
The issue, which is the focus of this Comment, concerns what a plaintiff
must allege to state a claim under the civil recovery provision, for injury by
reason of a violation of the use or investment prohibition.
A plaintiff can only recover for injury "by reason of a violation" of RICO.
The investment injury requirement raises the issue of whether a RICO viola-
tion, for these purposes, includes the receipt of income. Restated, the issue is
whether a plaintiff must allege injuries by reason of the use or investment of
income derived by racketeering activities, or instead may merely allege injury
flowing from the predicate racketeering acts themselves that created the
income."
A hypothetical may help introduce this often complex and technical issue:
Suppose Defendant runs an elaborate mail fraud scheme (for simplicity's sake,
with no accomplices). Assume that this operation rises to the level of a "pat-
tern of racketeering."12 Assume further that the operation of the mail fraud
scheme generates income. Defendant invests the income from this operation in
an enterprise. This investment would violate section 1962(a), which prohibits
the use or investment of income from a pattern of racketeering activity in an
10. Id. § 1964(c).
11. At least two student notes have commented on the investment injury issue, each focusing on
a particular case that has contributed to the interpretive split. See Scott A. Miskimon, Note, The
Fourth Circuit Rejects Civil RICO's Investment Use Rule: Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 69 N.C.
L. REv. 770 (1991) (focusing on Busby v. Crown Supply, 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990)); Kristen
H. Sorenson, Note, RICO's Section 1962(a) and the Investment Use Rule: Is Big Business Off the
Hook?, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1215 (focusing on Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989)).
This Comment refers to the investment injury issue as an issue of what a section 1962(a) plain-
tiff must allege to state a claim. Courts adjudicating the issue usually have referred to it as such.
See, e.g., Eastern Corporate Fed. Credit Union v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 639 F. Supp.
1532, 1536-37 (D. Mass. 1986) (concluding that a section 1962(a) plaintiff must allege invest-
ment injury "to state a claim"). Other courts have referred to it as a causation issue. See, e.g.,
Avirgan v. Hull, 691 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (referring to the two different views
"with respect to causation under § 1962(a)"), afd on other grounds, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir.
1991). The difference may be pure semantics. See Busby v. Crown Supply, 896 F.2d 833, 840
(4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the distinction between standing and causation as irrelevant to the
issue's disposition).
Phrasing the issue as one of sufficiency of pleadings, however, avoids a potential source of con-
fusion that phrasing the issue as one of causation invites. Even after a court decides the invest-
ment injury issue, it must decide whether a plaintiff meets, as a matter of causation, whatever
requirement the court imposes. It is helpful to keep these two questions conceptually separate.
Referring to the factual determination of whether a plaintiff meets the requirement as the causa-
tion issue, while referring to the initial legal question of whether a plaintiff must allege investment
injury as the pleadings issue, helps achieve this conceptual separation.
12. A "pattern of racketeering" is one of RICO's many terms of art. The nature of a RICO
pattern of racketeering is discussed infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. For the purpose of
this introductory hypothetical, it is enough to know that there must be a pattern for a RICO
violation to occur and to assume that the hypothetical plaintiff can allege one.
[Vol. 41:475
CIVIL RICO SECTION 1962(A)
enterprise. Plaintiff is a victim of Defendant's mail fraud scheme. Section
1964(c) allows a private plaintiff who is injured by a RICO violation to claim
treble damages. If a court imposes an investment injury requirement for a
section 1962(a) civil RICO claim, then Plaintiff will be unsuccessful, as he
was not injured by Defendant's investment. Only a plaintiff injured by the
investment of the income will be able to state a claim.
Four federal circuit courts, including the Second Circuit, have imposed such
an investment injury requirement,13 thus drastically limiting the potential
number of civil RICO plaintiffs.14 The Fourth Circuit has rejected such a
requirement.1"
This Comment explores that split in the circuits. Section One introduces
RICO in a broad sense by outlining its text. That section explains the funda-
mental controversy over RICO's intended reach. The judicial response to the
interpretive controversy is also introduced with a focus on the history of the
judicially created limitations on RICO.
Section Two explains the context of the investment injury issue and why it
has become a focus of judicial attention. That section catalogues the positions
of the various federal courts on investment injury. Further, it introduces the
majority and minority approaches to the investment injury requirement.
Section Three analyzes the interplay of RICO sections 1962(a) and
1964(c), and argues that the imposition of an investment injury requirement is
consistent with the explicit language of RICO. This Comment also argues that
while judicially created limitations on RICO are highly suspect, the invest-
ment injury requirement in section 1962(a) actions is nevertheless a legitimate
limitation found in the language of the statute. Finally, Section Four explains
how the investment injury requirement drastically limits the number and kind
of actionable civil RICO claims.
I. RICO IN GENERAL
The investment injury requirement is a complicated sub-issue in a tangled
13. See Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center, 941 F.2d 1220, 1229-30 (D.C.
Cir. 1991); Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1990); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d
331, 357-58 (3d Cir. 1989); Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1149-51 (10th
Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989); cf Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 494
(6th Cir. 1990) (stating in dicta that an investment injury must be plead to state a section
1962(a) action).
14. See infra notes 261-66 and accompanying text (describing the impact of the investment
injury requirement).
15. Busby v. Crown Supply, 896 F.2d 833, 840 (4th Cir. 1990).
The federal district courts also had split on the investment injury requirement before any circuit
court addressed the issue. See James A. Moss, Civil RICO: Special Problems, in RICO: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY § 3.03[2] (Jed S. Rakoff & Howard W. Goldstein eds., 2d
release 1990) (recognizing a controversy among federal district courts on the question of an addi-
tional investment injury requirement in civil RICO section 1962(a) claims); see also infra notes
131-45 (chronicling the split among circuit and district courts).
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area of law.16 In order to fully understand and analyze this particular sub-
issue, it is first necessary to discuss and gain an understanding of the RICO
statute as a whole. Therefore, RICO's text, the controversy over its reach, and
its case law will initially be discussed.
A. RICO's Text
To understand the investment injury issue, it is necessary to be familiar with
three aspects of the text of RICO: the statute's overall structure, its prohibi-
tions, and its provision for private civil recovery for injury from a violation of
its prohibitions.
1. Overall Structure
RICO is, at least in part, an attempt to combat organized crime.17 Because
criminalizing the status of being an organized criminal would be unconstitu-
tional,"s Congress created an intricate structure that seeks to combat activities
traditionally associated with organized criminals. 9 RICO criminalizes the or-
16. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 661
(1987) (noting the high level of controversy surrounding RICO). The Second Circuit has com-
mented, "Even a cursory review of the case law indicates that there is simply no consensus on
what RICO requires." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
17. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of RICO was to eliminate "the
infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in inter-
state commerce." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969). The congressional Statement
of Findings and Purposes accompanying the Organized Crime Control Act serves to bolster that
contention:
It is the purpose of this act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence gathering process, by establish-
ing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to
deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (Statement of Findings and Purpose) (1969).
The belief that RICO was designed only to combat organized crime has been vigorously chal-
lenged. See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster
Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: Mother of God, Is This the End
of RICO?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 860 (1990) ("[T]he first and most powerful myth ... is that
RICO was designed to deal only with organized crime.").
18. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). In Robinson, the Court held that the
criminalization of the status of being addicted to narcotics violated the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Id. The general proposition that status crimes are uncon-
stitutional prevented Congress from criminalizing the status of being an organized criminal. See
infra note 19.
19. See Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 693
(1990). Reed, an attorney in private practice, stated that "Congress ... could not draft statutory
language proscribing membership in organized crime because of constitutional prohibitions
against status offenses and because of vagueness concerns. Apparently aware of these obstacles to
direct prohibition of organized crime, Congress chose indirect means to reach organized crime."
[Vol. 41:475
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ganized and persistent commission of certain other specified crimes.2 0
. The RICO statute contains two definitions essential to its overall frame-
work. First, RICO defines "racketeering activity" by listing a number of of-
fenses.2" This long list of offenses, often referred to as "predicate acts,"22 com-
prises a large subsection of RICO, and can be grouped for simplicity's sake
into three categories.2 The first category is any act "chargeable" under sev-
eral state criminal laws that is punishable by more than one year in prison,
including murder, arson, and narcotics offenses.2 4 The second category is any
act "indictable" under numerous federal criminal provisions, including mail
and wire fraud.2 ' The third category is any offense involving bankruptcy or
securities fraud or drug related activities that is "punishable" under federal
law.2
6
20. See infra note 26 (listing the crimes that can form the basis of a RICO pattern). Professor
Lynch summed up RICO well when he referred to it as "The Crime of Being a Criminal." Lynch,
supra note 16, at 661.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (quoted in full infra note 26).
22. See, e.g., Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1990) (referring to the of-
fenses as "predicate acts of racketeering"); Busby v. Crown Supply, 896 F.2d 833, 836 (4th Cir.
1990) (referring to the offenses as "predicate racketeering acts").
23. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1985) (dividing the predicate
offenses as done in this Comment's text, infra text accompanying notes 24-26).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a).
25. Id.
26. Id. The complete statutory definition of "racketeering activity" is:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, brib-
ery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous
drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of
title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating
to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (re-
lating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is
felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds),
sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1029 (relating
to fraud and related activity in gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail
fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial insti-
tution fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating
to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investiga-
tions), section 1511 (relating to obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section
1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513
(relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating
to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering para-
phernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955
(relating to the prohibition, of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to
the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in mone-
tary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity), section 1958
(relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-
hire), sections 2251-2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of children), sections 2312
and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314
and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2321 (relat-
ing to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346
(relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-2424 (relating to
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Also essential to the overall framework is RICO's definition of the term
"pattern of racketeering activity. '27 Actually, the statute only helps define
that phrase by establishing that a "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires
at least two acts of racketeering activity ... the last of which occurred within
ten years . . . after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 2 8
The Supreme Court has interpreted this two-acts-within-ten-years requirement
as the minimum necessary for a RICO "pattern," not as the definitive point at
which a pattern occurs.2 9 The question of what constitutes a pattern has been
a continuing source of confusion for federal courts. 30 The Supreme Court's
essential guidance has been to require a criminal prosecutor or civil plaintiff to
prove "continuity" or "continuity plus relationship" to establish a pattern. 1
Next, RICO establishes four "prohibited activities.""2 These prohibited ac-
tivities are: investing or using the income from a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity in an enterprise; 8 acquiring or maintaining an interest or control in an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity;84 conducting or partici-
pating in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering; 5 and
conspiring to violate any of the above three prohibitions.8 Again, it is the first
white slave traffic); (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States
Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organiza-
tions) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense
involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or
the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of
the United States, or (E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act ....
Id.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.14 (1985) ("The implication [of sec-
tion 1961(5)] is that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient.").
30. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia observed that the search for a meaningful concept of pattern produced "the widest
and most divergent split on an issue of federal law in recent memory." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. H.J., 492 U.S. at 239-41. In H.J., the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's requirement that
a pattern involve multiple schemes. The Court instead held that the pleading need only establish
"continuity of racketeering activity, or its threat, simpliciter." Id. at 241. The H.J. holding built
on a footnote in an earlier Supreme Court opinion defining a RICO "pattern" as "continuity plus
relationship." Id. at 239 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.14 (1985)).
There are indications that the H.J. decision does little to clarify the pattern issue. See id. at 252
(Scalia, J., concurring) (tracing the history of the Court's pattern adjudication and finding no
further guidance in the majority opinion); Kent R. Cutler, Note, The Civil Use of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: A Problem for the 1990s, 35 S.D. L. REV. 150 (1990)
(noting the judicial confusion before H.J. and arguing the decision does little to provide a mean-
ingful definition of a RICO pattern).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
33. Id. § 1962(a).
34. Id. § 1962(b).
35. Id. § 1962(c).
36. Id. § 1962(d).
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prohibited activity, the investment or use of income from a pattern of racke-
teering activity, that is of primary concern to this Comment.
RICO provides both criminal and civil penalties for violations of its prohibi-
tions. The three criminal penalties are imprisonment,37 fines, 8 and forfeiture
of property.89 The two civil remedies are preventative and restraining mea-
sures imposed against the racketeer, " and recovery of treble damages and at-
torneys' fees for injuries caused by a RICO violation. 1
In addition to these provisions, Congress included a "liberal construction
clause" in the Organized Crime Control Act, which created RICO, instructing
that the "provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes."'12 The judiciary has been divided as to the proper role of
this clause in the interpretation of RICO.'-
2. Prohibitions
The basic nature of RICO's four "prohibited activities" was introduced
above."4 However, the content of these prohibited activities demands further
elaboration since they form half the basis of the investment injury issue. While
only section 1962(a), the investment prohibition, is at issue, familiarity with
the language of the entire body of prohibitions is necessary for a discussion of
that section.
a. The investment prohibition
The language of section 1962(a) is quoted in this Comment's Introduction.45
Section 1962(a) prohibits the investment or use of the proceeds from a pattern
of racketeering in an enterprise.' 6 For example, a section 1962(a) violation
37. Id. § 1963(a).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 1963(b)-(m).
40. Id. § 1964(a)-(b).
41. Id. § 1964(c). The statute also outlines its venue and process requirements, id. § 1965;
allows expedition of RICO actions for public policy reasons, id. § 1966; provides for judicial dis-
cretion on whether proceedings under the Act will be open or closed, id. § 1967; and authorizes
the Attorney General to serve a civil investigative demand for relevant documents, id. § 1968.
42. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
43. See infra notes 184-88, 217-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two distinct
approaches as exemplified by Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1990) (re-
quiring investment injury in civil RICO section 1962(a) actions) and Busby v. Crown Supply, 896
F.2d 833, 836-40 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the investment injury requirement in civil RICO
section 1962(a) actions).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36 (briefly stating what each subsection prohibits).
45. See supra text accompanying note 9.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). The section exempts standard purchases of securities from its prohibi-
tion by providing that "[a] purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment,
and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer," is excluded if
the securities of the purchaser, the purchaser's family, and the purchaser's accomplices do not
aggregately amount to one percent of outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer
the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer. Id.
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occurred when a defendant who participated in drug trafficking deposited the
proceeds from the trafficking in the account of an enterprise.' 7
b. The acquisition/maintenance of interest/control prohibition
Section 1962(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain...
any interest or control of any enterprise ... engaged in, or ... affect[ing]
interstate or foreign commerce.
4 8
An example of a section 1962(b) violation occurred when certain defendants
took control of a local union organization through murder and extortion.48
c. The conduct or participate in affairs prohibition
Section 1962(c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or ... affect[ing], interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt.50
An example of a section 1962(c) violation occurred when the defendants con-
ducted the business of a retirement home through a pattern of fraud. 1
d. The conspiracy prohibition
Finally, section 1962(d) prohibits conspiring to violate sections 1962(a), (b),
or (c).51
3. Civil Recovery
Among RICO's civil remedies58 is the provision that "[a]ny person injured
47. See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1342-43 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1005 (1984).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b). Plaintiffs seldom use section 1962(b). DAVID B. SMITH & TERRANCE
G. REED, CIVIL RICO 1 5.03 (5th release 1990). Some courts have imposed a special injury
requirement in section 1962(b) civil actions. See, e.g., Rich Maid Kitchens v. Pennsylvania Lum-
berman's Mut. Ins. Co., 641 F. Supp. 297, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (finding that the plaintiff had no
standing under section 1962(b) where the plaintiff did not allege injury from the acquisition of an
enterprise), affd, 833 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1987).
49. See United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 270-71 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The Supreme Court has rejected special injury pleading requirements
with respect to this section. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). The Sedima
opinion is discussed fully infra notes 83-105 and accompanying text.
51. See Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1363 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
53. The other civil remedy is a district court's jurisdiction to "prevent or restrain" violations of
482 [Vol. 41:475
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in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962... may sue
... in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee."15 4 The interplay between this civil recovery provision and section
1962(a) gives rise to the investment injury question. 5
B. RICO's Purpose and Actual Use
RICO is an extremely controversial statute." The issue of the purpose be-
hind Congress' enactment of RICO is a prime source of this controversy. 57 On
section 1962. Appropriate orders listed in the statute are: "ordering any person to divest himself of
any interest . . . in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
investments of any person . . . ; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, mak-
ing due provision for the rights of innocent persons." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
54. Id. § 1964(c).
55. Because the investment injury issue arises from the language of the statute, other statutes
with similar wording presumably would create the same issue. Twenty-four states and Puerto Rico
have racketeering laws modeled at least in part on Federal RICO. See Richard L. Biggs & Laura
V. Potter, The Little Ricos: About to Grow?, 41 CONSUMER L. FIN. Q. REP. 3, 3 n.7, 4 (1987)
(citing state RICO statutes and describing the similarities and differences between state RICOs
and Federal RICO); see also RICO: BUSINESS DISPUTES AND THE "RACKETEERING"
LAWS-FEDERAL AND STATE 75-195 (CCH ed., 1984) (providing the full text of 18 state "Little
RICO" statutes). The language of some of these "Little RICO" statutes could potentially raise an
investment injury question similar to that arising in the federal statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 1503(c), 1505(c) (1987) (providing that "[ilt is unlawful ... to use or invest" racke-
teering proceeds and providing civil recovery for any person injured "by reason of any conduct
constituting a violation" of the prohibitions).
56. Jed S. Rakoff, The Fundamentals of RICO, in RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND
STRATEGY, supra note 15, § 1.01 ("RICO . . . is one of the most controversial statutes in the
federal canon.").
Representative William Hughes (D-N.J.) has chronicled the numerous groups that have sup-
ported and opposed civil RICO amendments. Among the organizations, as listed by him, that have
petitioned Congress to amend civil RICO are as follows: The American Bar Association, National
Association of Manufacturers, American Civil Liberties Union, United States Chamber of Com-
merce, AFL-CIO, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Securities Industry Associ-
ation, American Bankers Association, Independent Bankers Association of America, Future In-
dustries Association, American Council of Life Insurance, Credit Union National Association,
Grocery Manufacturers of America, National Automobile Dealers Association, State Farm Insur-
ance Companies, Alliance of American Insurers, and The American Financial Services Associa-
tion. William J. Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much is Needed?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 639, 640
(1990).
Representative Hughes also lists organizations opposed to drastic civil RICO reform. These
organizations, as listed by him, include The Public Citizen-Congress Watch, The United States
Public Interest Research Group, National Association of Attorneys' General, National District
Attorneys Association, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and the North Ameri-
can Securities Administration Association. Id.
57. See Lynch, supra note 16, at 664 ("[T]he legislative history of the [RICO] statute has
been a source of controversy."); Robert K. Rasmussen, Introductory Remarks and a Comment on
Civil RICO's Remedial Provisions, 43 VAND. L. REV. 623, 624 (1990) (noting disagreement
among academics over whether Congress intended RICO to apply to anything but traditional
organized crime).
1992]
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one side of the controversy are those who advocate that RICO was meant to
fight organized crime and its infiltration into legitimate business. The advo-
cates of this interpretation argue that any application of the statute beyond
this scope is a violation of at least the intent of the statute.58 These parties
assert that Congress did not foresee RICO being applied to "ordinary com-
mercial disputes."50
Others have asserted that the intent of RICO is broader. Professor G. Rob-
ert Blakey, whose involvement in drafting RICO has drawn added attention to
his work,60 has led commentators supporting a more liberal application of
RICO. Writing in collaboration with Michael Perry, he asserted that "RICO
was designed to deal with organized crime, but it also was crafted more
broadly to deal with all forms of 'enterprise criminality.' "161
The legislative history of RICO's civil recovery provision is particularly in
dispute. Advocates of a limited reading tend to view the civil recovery provi-
sion as "spot-welded""2 to the more important criminal provisions, a hasty ad-
dition. 8 Their opponents, meanwhile, see the civil recovery provision as the
focus of RICO.6
The concern over RICO's intended reach" has arisen primarily in the area
of civil, 6" not criminal , RICO. This concern surfaced due to the dramatic
58. See, e.g.. Lynch, supra note 16, at 664 ("[Those who]... have found in the legislative
history [of the statute] much broader purposes [than fighting organized crime] and have used
their findings to justify sweeping interpretations of the statute ... [are] wrong.").
59. Blakey & Perry, supra note 17, at 860 (quoting Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 109-11 (1985) (statement of
Ray J. Groves, Chair, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants)).
60. Lynch, supra note 16, at 670-71.
61. Blakey & Perry, supra note 17, at 866.
62. P.M.F. Servs. v. Grady, 681 F. Supp. 549, 555 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
63. See, e.g., id. (tracing RICO's legislative history and concluding the civil recovery provision
was a last-minute addition to the final version of the statute); Susan Getzendanner, Judicial
"Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" Civil RICO Cases Does Not Work: It's Time for Congress
to Act, 43 VAND. L. REv. 673, 677-78 (1990) (noting that commentators have concluded Congress
gave little consideration at all to the consequences or reach of civil RICO).
64. See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Ben-
nett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237 (1982) (analyzing RICO's legislative history and
suggesting the fundamental importance of the civil recovery provision).
65. For extensive citations to academic commentary concerning this controversy, see Blakey &
Perry, supra note 17, at 862 n.18. Open criticism of RICO's present reach has also emanated
from the United States Supreme Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist has criticized RICO in this re-
gard. See William H. Rehnquist, Reforming Diversity Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, 21 ST.
MARY's L.J. 5, 9 (1989) (originally presented at the Brookings Institute's Eleventh Seminar on the
Administration of Justice, Apr. 7, 1989) (urging congressional reform to cure RICO's expansion
into "garden-variety civil fraud cases"). Justice Scalia recently voiced constitutional concerns over
RICO's vagueness in a concurring opinion, H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
256 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), which attracted three other Justices. Justice Scalia asserted,
"That the highest Court in the land has been unable to derive from [RICO] anything more than
today's meager guidance bodes ill for the day when [a constitutional] challenge is presented." Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring).
66. Michael Goldsmith & Mark J. Linderman, Civil RICO Reform: The Gatekeeper Concept,
[Vol. 41:475
CIVIL RICO SECTION 1962(A)
increase in the number of civil RICO cases over the last decade. According to
one source, only 300 civil RICO cases were filed between 1970 and 1985,
while 957 such cases were filed in 1988 alone.6 8 This trend probably will con-
tinue.6 9 The attraction of treble damages, attorney's fees, access to the federal
courts, and wielding the weapon of labelling a defendant a "racketeer" serves
to encourage plaintiffs to invoke civil RICO whenever possible.70
Beyond the sheer number of civil RICO cases, the kind of civil RICO cases
dominating the courts also has stirred controversy. Civil RICO primarily has
not been used against traditional organized crime, but has been used instead in
ordinary commercial disputes (often referred to as "garden-variety fraud"7 1 ).
In 1985, the Supreme Court cited startling statistics indicating that of known
civil RICO cases at trial, 40 % concerned securities fraud, 3 % concerned com-
mercial common law fraud, and only 9% involved "allegations of criminal ac-
tivity of a type generally associated with professional criminals." The Supreme
Court also cited a survey concluding that civil RICO claims involving securi-
ties transactions and commercial disputes far overshadowed any other cate-
gory of civil RICO claims."'
43 VAND. L. REV. 735, 735 (1990) (stating that civil RICO has been a perpetual target of criti-
cism and reform efforts); Rasmussen, supra note 57, at 627 (stating that, with the inventiveness of
lawyers, the civil remedy has taken RICO into areas unanticipated by Congress).
67. Apparently, prosecutorial discretion has kept criminal RICO out of the sort of controversy
erupting over civil RICO. The incentives that private civil attorneys have to invoke civil RICO are
unchecked by significant countervailing considerations. The Department of Justice, however, has
exercised self-restraint in the use of criminal RICO. See Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO
Policies of the Department of Justice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 651, 655 (1990) (stating that the De-
partment of Justice has kept criminal RICO under control while the civil RICO controversy has
exploded); Hughes, supra note 56, at 643 (asserting that Congress perceives the Department of
Justice as properly restrained in its use of criminal RICO); Rehnquist, supra note 65, at 10
(pointing out that while prosecutorial discretion serves to check criminal RICO, no such avenue
for controlling. civil RICO exists among plaintiffs' attorneys).
68. Hughes, supra note 56, at 644 (citing ABA SEC. OF CORP., BANKING & BUSINESS LAW,
REP. OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE 55 (1985) and Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (not
officially printed)). Representative Hughes stated that these figures may be drastic underesti-
mates. Id.
69. Rehnquist, supra note 65, at 9 ("[T]here is every reason to think that we can expect a
substantial increase in this already high number [of civil RICO cases] because of the statute's
lucrative treble damages provisions and the extensive coverage recently afforded civil RICO ac-
tions by the national media, legal publications, and continuing legal education programs.").
70. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 504-06 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71. See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 65, at 9. By "garden-variety fraud," Justice Rehnquist and
others are generally referring to mail and wire fraud usually litigated at the state level. See, e.g..
id. Justice Rehnquist also lists among the more interesting areas to which RICO has been applied:
"divorce, trespass, legal and accounting malpractice, inheritance among family members, employ-
ment benefits, and sexual harassment by a union." Id. at 11. Contra Blakey & Perry, supra note
17, at 881-909 (denying that RICO has been applied too broadly).
72. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 n.16; see also Thomas F. Harrison, Look Who's Using RICO, 75
A.B.A. J. 56(4) (1989) (deploring the variety of civil claims to which RICO is applied); John G.
Odom & Victoria K. McHenry, Creative Applications of Civil RICO, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
245, 256-75 (1987) (using actual and hypothetical cases to explore the outer boundaries of
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These "garden-variety fraud" cases typically arise when mail fraud"7 and/or
wire fraud74 are used as the predicate acts that form the pattern of racketeer-
ing.75 Through RICO, a plaintiff in an ordinary commercial fraud dispute can
RICO's application); Steven W. Colford, RICO False-Ad Suits Rock Industry, ADVERTISING
AGE, Oct. 8, 1990, at 1, 84 ("[RICO], designed to attack organized crime, is now being used to
charge that false advertising is civil fraud.").
73. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1341 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). The breadth of the federal mail fraud stat-
ute is apparent from its text:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, repre-
sentations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, dis-
tribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious
coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated
or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or know-
ingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place
at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such
matter or thing, shall be fined ...or imprisoned ...or both.
Id.
Judicial interpretation of the federal mail fraud statute has broadened its reach as well. See
Odom & McHenry, supra note 72, at 256.
74. 18 U.S.C.S § 1343 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). The federal wire fraud statute's breadth is
also apparent from its text:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, repre-
sentations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio,
or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs,
signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall
be fined . . . or imprisoned ...or both.
Id.
Judicial interpretation of the federal wire fraud statute has expanded its reach as well. See
Odom & McHenry, supra note 72, at 256.
75. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500. The Sedima court stated, "The 'extraordinary' uses to which civil
RICO has been put appear to be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses, in
particular the inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud, and the failure of Congress and the
courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern.'" Id. Justice Marshall agreed in his Sedima
dissent. Id. at 501 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated, "The single most significant
reason for the expansive use of civil RICO has been the presence in the statute, as predicate acts,
of mail and wire fraud violations." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Commentators have also made this point. See, e.g., Getzendanner, supra note 63, at 678-79.
Ms. Getzendanner, formerly a federal judge in the Northern District of Illinois, asserted:
The vast majority of civil RICO cases use mail, wire, or securities fraud as the predi-
cate offense .... Virtually every published case of which I am aware, in which the
RICO claims were predicated exclusively on mail or wire fraud, concerns a commer-
cial dispute to which the attorney has added unremarkable fraud allegations.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Ms. Getzendanner has advocated the elimination of mail, wire, and securities fraud as predicate
acts unless the case involves a large class of plaintiffs. See generally id. (maintaining that such a
RICO reform would eliminate most controversial problems with the statute). While on the federal
bench, Ms. Getzendanner's position on the investment injury issue was unclear. Compare In re
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gain the immense advantages of a RICO claim 76 by alleging a pattern of
fraudulent letters and phone calls.
RICO's expansion into areas arguably outside the statute's intended scope is
especially unsettling because, while civil RICO allows recovery in such cases,
the statute arguably has had no impact on organized crime. 7 For perhaps
obvious reasons, plaintiffs typically are unwilling to serve process on a bona
fide mobster.7
8
RICO is a statute designed to punish and provide civil recovery for injuries
from certain activities related to patterns of racketeering. Whether the intent
of Congress was to combat only traditional organized crime or to combat
tamer commercial fraud as well is a subject of much discussion. Whatever the
"true" intent of Congress, civil RICO has been applied to the tamer arena of
garden variety fraud, to the virtual exclusion of organized crime.
C. Judicial Interpretation of RICO
A significant portion of the judicial interpretation of RICO can be summa-
rized simply. Lower federal courts have searched for limits to RICO based on
their interpretation of the purpose of the statute. The Supreme Court, and in
some instances appellate courts, have rejected those limits based primarily on
RICO's explicit language.7
9
Three Supreme Court cases, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,80 American
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc.,"1 and H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co.,8s rejected bodies of lower court law that sought to limit
RICO. These Supreme Court cases provide the clearest examples of the his-
Olympia Brewing Co. Secs. Litig., No. 77 C 1206, 1985 WL 8801, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 1985)
(concluding that with no injury requirements in section 1962(c) it would be illogical to impose
such requirements on section 1962(a)) with Heritage Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Cicero, 629
F. Supp. 1412, 1417 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (dismissing a section 1962(a) claim because "tihe ...
complaint fails to allege how plaintiffs were injured by the (defendant's] use or investment of the
racketeering income.").
Representative Hughes and Chief Justice Rehnquist have commented on the effect of the inclu-
sion of mail and wire fraud as well. See Hughes, supra note 56, at 626 (stating that the keys to
both civil and criminal RICO are mail and wire fraud); Rehnquist, supra note 65, at 9 (asserting
that the civil RICO explosion happened "[i]n part, because it creates a civil counterpart for crimi-
nal wire fraud and mail fraud prosecutions").
76. See supra text accompanying note 70 for a list of advantages a RICO count provides for a
civil plaintiff.
77. See generally Gerard E. Lynch, How Useful is Civil RICO to the Enforcement of Criminal
Law?, 35 VILL. L. REV. 67 (1990).
78. See PAUL A. BATISTA, CIVIL RICO PRACTICE MANUAL 5 (1987) (stating that not one
private civil RICO action has been filed against traditional organized criminals and suggesting the
reason is potential mob intimidation); SMITH & REED, supra note 48, 1 5.02[1] n.4 (finding no
section 1962(a) actions filed against "a real organized crime figure").
79. Rakoff, supra note 56, § 1.01.
80. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
81. 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (per curiam).
82. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
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tory of the judicial response to RICO.
Sedima is a leading Supreme Court decision interpreting RICO. It is espe-
cially relevant to this discussion because the effect of its precedent on the in-
vestment injury requirement has perplexed the lower courts. 88
Before Sedima, many lower courts were attempting to impose extra plead-
ing requirements on civil RICO plaintiffs who claimed injuries flowing from
violations of section 1962(c).84 Section 1962(c) prohibits conducting or partici-
pating in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering.85
Among these extra requirements had been that a plaintiff must have suffered
some "racketeering injury" (an injury RICO was designed to prevent, some-
how linked to racketeering).88 Another requirement had been that a plaintiff
had suffered some competitive injury, or injury traced to the plaintiff's com-
petitive loss from the racketeer's support of the competition.87 A third require-
ment imposed by some lower courts had been that a civil RICO defendant be
criminally convicted of the claimed RICO violation.88 This effort to limit
RICO can be traced to a desire to provide limits on the statute's expanding
breadth, which has allowed prosecutors and plaintiffs to use the statute in dis-
putes perhaps not contemplated by Congress.88
In Sedima, a divided Supreme Court rejected the three limiting require-
ments. The Court held that the language and history of RICO does not invite
the requirements, and that it would violate RICO's remedial purposes to im-
pose them.8"
Sedima concerned a civil RICO suit claiming injury from a violation of
section 1962(c). 91 The plaintiff corporation believed the defendant corporation
83. The Second Circuit used Sedima to justify the investment injury requirement. See infra
notes 169-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Second Circuit's approach in
Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit used Sedima to reach
the opposite conclusion. See infra notes 207-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Fourth Circuit's approach in Busby v. Crown Supply, 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990).
84. Rakoff, supra note 56, § 1.01.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
86. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984) (relying on
legislative purpose and statutory "by reason of" language to impose racketeering-type injury re-
quirement), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985); Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235,
1240-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (requiring that a RICO plaintiff allege a "distinct RICO injury");
Harper v. New Japan Secs. Int'l, 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (requiring "injury of
the type the RICO statute was intended to prevent"); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades,
Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (rejecting a competitive injury
requirement, but requiring a "racketeering enterprise injury").
87. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (find-
ing support in legislative history for imposing a competitive injury requirement); North Barrington
Dev. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 210-11 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (enforcing a competitive injury re-
quirement because RICO was not designed to compensate for injury from predicate offenses).
88. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (briefly discussing this requirement).
89. See Rakoff, supra note 56, § 1.07(1) (stating that section 1962(c) injury limits were for the
courts "one method of limiting the profusion of civil RICO actions").
90. Sedima, 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985).
91. Id. at 484.
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had cheated it by overbilling." The plaintiff filed suit, alleging mail fraud and
wire fraud as predicate acts for a violation of section 1962(c) from which it
suffered injury." The Second Circuit had affirmed a district court dismissal of
the suit for failure to state a claim.9 ' The circuit court found the plaintiff's
claim failed because it did not allege a "racketeering injury"" and because it
did not allege that the defendants had already been convicted of the predicate
acts of mail and wire fraud. 0
The Supreme Court heard the plaintiff's appeal and rejected both require-
ments. 7 Although the Supreme Court sympathized with the Second Circuit's
concern over the consequences of an "unbridled reading" of RICO," the
Court nevertheless rejected the imposition of requirements it found to be viola-
tive of the explicit language and purpose of RICO.99
Considering the imposition of a special "racketeering injury" requirement,
the Court found no such limitation in the language or history of RICO. 100
Further, it read the legislative history of RICO as requiring a broad, rather
than restricted, reading. The Court asserted that such a requirement would
frustrate the broad remedial purpose of the statute.'0
Considering the "prior conviction" requirement, the Court again found no
such limit in the language or history of the statute.10 The Court also rejected
any limit based on a desire to impose more rigorous proof requirements on
civil RICO plaintiffs or based on constitutional concerns.' 03
In the portion of the opinion rejecting the racketeering injury requirement,
two statements by the Court are important to the investment injury discussion.
In one passage, the Court, referring to section 1962 in its entirety, stated that
when a plaintiff is injured by racketeering activities, the plaintiff will have a
section 1962(c) claim. 04 In another important passage, the Supreme Court
noted that the "essence" of a section 1962(c) violation is the racketeering ac-
92. Id. at 483-84.
93. Id.
94. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
95. Id. at 494-96.
96. Id. at 496.
97. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500.
98. Id. at 481. The Court stated, "While we understand the [lower] court's concern over the
consequences of an unbridled reading of the statute, we reject both of its holdings." Id.
99. Id. at 499-500.
100. Id. at 495. The Court found no "racketeering injury" requirement in the language of the
statute and called such a requirement "amorphous." Id.
The Court had difficulty enunciating the exact meaning of the Second Circuit's "racketeering
injury" requirement and referred to it as "vague." Id. at 494. The Court felt no need to fully
enunciate the nature of the requirement in order to reject it. See id. at 495.
101. Id. at 497-500.
102. Id. at 488-90.
103. Id. at 490-93.
104. Id. at 495 ("If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner
forbidden by [sections 1962(a)-(c)], and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his busi-
ness or property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c).").
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tivities, or predicate acts. Damages, the Court stated, should compensate in-
jury from those predicate acts. 0
Along with Sedima, the Supreme Court handed down its companion case,
American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc..101 Haroco affirmed, per
curiam, the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the requirement that a plaintiff al-
lege injury from the conduct of the enterprise, not just injuries from predicate
acts, to bring a section 1962(c) action.1 07
To examine the logic of the Haroco decision, the language of section
1962(c) must be recalled. Section 1962(c) prohibits "any person . . . associ-
ated with any enterprise . . . [from] conduct[ing] or participat[ing] . . . in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering. '08
Regarding section 1962(c), the district court held that "to be cognizable under
RICO [the injury] must be caused by a RICO violation and not simply by the
commission of predicate offenses."' 109 A RICO violation, recall, is an activity
prohibited by section 1962. A predicate offense is a "sub-crime" that makes
up the pattern of racketeering activity forming the basis of the prohibited
activity.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the require-
ment, relying on its analysis in Sedima.10 Regarding section 1962(c) actions,
the Court rejected a requirement that the injury flow from some other source
than the predicate racketeering acts.'
While not as directly relevant to the investment injury issue as Sedima and
Haroco, the Supreme Court's decision in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co.'12 provides a further example of the Supreme Court's rejection of
spurious limits on civil RICO actions. The heart of H.J. addressed and re-
jected the "multiple scheme" pattern limitation imposed by the Eighth Cir-
cuit." But the Court also examined a requirement that a civil RICO plaintiff
prove that the alleged injury resulted from "organized crime.' 1 ' The Court
105. Id. at 497 ("[T]he essence of the [section 1962(c)] violation is the commission of those
acts in connection with the conduct of the enterprise.").
Two dissents were filed in Sedima. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
and Powell, rejected the majority's analysis of the history and text of RICO. Justice Marshall
attacked the majority's textual interpretation that allowed recovery for injury from RICO predi-
cate acts. Id. at 500 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's separate dissent emphasized or-
ganized crime as the target of RICO and hesitated to adopt an interpretation of the statute that
would broaden it beyond that goal. Id. at 523 (Powell, J., dissenting).
106. 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (per curiam).
107. Id.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
109. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust, 577 F. Supp. 111, 114 (N.D. III. 1983),
.rev'd, 747 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (per curiam).
110. See Haroco, 473 U.S. at 609.
111. Id.
112. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
113. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of that portion of the
opinion.
114. H.J., 492 U.S. at 243-44.
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rejected the requirement, refusing to impose a limiting pattern requirement
not found in the language or history of the statute.116
The majority of the Court rejected the contention that "RICO's broad lan-
guage should be read narrowly" to ensure that the statute combats only organ-
ized crime. " 6 Justice Scalia, in addition, penned a concurring opinion that
blatantly questioned the constitutionality of RICO on vagueness grounds.
1 1 7
Despite this hostility, Justice Scalia and three Justices joining him would not
advocate artificially created limitations. " 8
In Sedima, Haroco, and H.J., the Supreme Court resisted the temptation to
limit RICO in ways found neither in the statute's text nor its legislative his-
tory. While encouraging legislative reform of RICO11 9 and supporting the
goals of the lower courts in limiting RICO, 20 the Court nevertheless refused
to effectuate those goals judicially. In Sedima, the Supreme Court rejected
injury requirements in section 1962(c) actions, but used broad linguistic
brushstrokes that arguably apply to the interpretation of section 1962(a).
II. THE SECTION 1962(A) INVESTMENT INJURY REQUIREMENT
Against this backdrop of prior judicial efforts to limit civil RICO, the sec-
tion 1962(a) investment injury requirement has emerged. To facilitate a better
understanding of this limitation, this section of the Comment first explains the
growing importance of section 1962(a) in civil RICO actions. The position of
the federal courts is then chronicled. The section then follows the reasoning of
the two most recent federal appellate cases that have taken definitive positions
on the issue.
A. The Emergence of Section 1962(a) Actions
When the number of civil RICO cases first escalated in the mid-1980s, 21
section 1962(c) claims comprised the vast majority of total civil RICO cases.
Section 1962(a) cases were a rarity. 22 The current trend, however, is that
section 1962(a) claims comprise an increasingly larger percentage of civil
RICO claims filed.1
28
115. Id. at 249.
116. Id. at 245.
117. Id, at 256 (Scalia, J., concurring).
118. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. The Supreme Court has not been shy about suggesting that congressional reform should
be the solution, if there is to be one, to RICO's breadth: In H.J., the majority stated, "RICO may
be a poorly drafted statute, but rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it is so inclined . H..." t.J.,
492 U.S. at 249.
120. See supra text accompanying note 98 (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized the
concern over the consequences of an "unbridled reading" of RICO).
121. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (noting the increase in civil RICO claims).
122. SMITH & REED, supra note 48, 5.02[l].
123. Id. Smith and Reed asserted that while section 1962(a) has been little-used, "it is becom-
ing recognized as the biggest gun in the RICO arsenal, [and so] the limited body of case law
construing section 1962(a) should grow substantially in the next few years." Id.
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This trend is due in large part to an almost universally accepted judicial
interpretation of RICO that has drastically limited section 1962(c) claims.
That interpretation is the section 1962(c) person/enterprise distinction.1" '
In section 1962(c), the prohibition against conducting the affairs of an en-
terprise through a pattern of racketeering, the "person" who is conducting the
affairs of the enterprise through such a pattern must be "employed by or asso-
ciated with [the] enterprise."" 8 A majority of federal courts have interpreted
this statutory language as requiring that the "person" (who is the defendant)
and the "enterprise" be separate entities. 26 A plaintiff alleging a section
1962(c) violation therefore must point to two different entities-the one doing
the conducting and the one being conducted. The plaintiff may not point to
only one entity that is conducting its own affairs through a pattern of
racketeering.
This limitation has significant effects. It substantially hampers section
1962(c) claims against corporate defendants that are based on the defendant
fraudulently conducting its own affairs.'2 An employee of the corporation,
who is involved in the fraud, will still be a distinct entity, and therefore will
continue to be exposed to section 1962(c) liability. Reaching the employee's
pockets, however, is not the goal of plaintiffs' attorneys.2  They seek the cor-
porate deep pockets, often sealed by the section 1962(c) person/enterprise
distinction.'"
With section 1962(c) actions less accessible because of the person/enter-
prise distinction, plaintiffs have pursued section 1962(a) actions. Section
1962(a) actions gradually received fuller litigation and the issue of a section
124. Rakoff, supra note 56, § 1.061[1] (stating that "recently ... [section 1962(a)] has in-
creasingly been employed as a way of avoiding the section 1962(c) [person/enterprise] 'identity
problem' ").
125. 18 U.S.C, § 1962(c) (1988).
126. See Busby v. Crown Supply, 896 F.2d 833, 840 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[Tlhe alleged 'person'
who violates []§ 1962(c) must be different from the 'enterprise.' "); Schofield v. First Commodity
Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 29-31 (1st Cir. 1986) (refusing to "strain[]" the language of RICO to reject
the distinction); Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring
that a violation by a corporate entity be against a different entity), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1058
(1986); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 400 (7th Cir. 1984)
(adopting a requirement of "separate entities" in section 1962(c) actions), affd on other grounds,
473 U.S. 606 (1985); Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1984) (same).
Only the Eleventh Circuit has rejected the distinction. Rakoff, supra note 56, § 1.05[3] (citing
United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 987-90 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170
(1983)).
127. Busby, 896 F.2d at 839 (arguing that corporate liability would be all but eliminated
through the section 1962(c) person/enterprise distinction in combination with the section 1962(a)
investment injury requirement).
128. Thomas E. Dwyer, Jr. & Stephen Kiely, Vicarious Civil Liability Under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 21 CAL. W. L. REV. 324, 325 (1985) ("[A] workable
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1962(a) investment injury requirement emerged. 180
B. The Position of the Federal Courts
The investment injury issue concerns whether a plaintiff bringing a civil
RICO suit for injuries flowing from a violation of section 1962(a) must allege
injury from the investment of racketeering proceeds, or merely may allege in-
jury from the predicate acts that created the income. This issue, now a focal
point of the more general civil RICO controversy, has split the federal courts.
Only five of the thirteen federal circuit courts of appeals have taken defini-
tive stands on the investment injury requirement. The Second, 8 1 Third, 82
Tenth, 83 and D.C.184 Circuits have required investment injury for section
1962(a) actions, while the Fourth Circuit has rejected such a requirement.1 35
The Sixth,186 Seventh,187 and Ninth 88 Circuits have explicitly suggested their
130. Rakoff, supra note 56, § 1.06[l]. The investment injury question apparently was not an
issue until the later 1980s. In 1986, a United States district court referred to the argument against
the investment injury requirement as "novel." DeMuro v. E.F. Hutton, 662 F. Supp. 308, 309
(N.D. Cal. 1986).
131. Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1990). Even before Ouaknine, the
Southern District of New York had unanimously accepted the investment injury requirement. See
Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries, 730 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Vista Co. v. Columbia
Pictures, 725 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Galerie Furstenburg v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Secs. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Veriens-Und Westbank AG v. Carter, 639 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
The Eastern District of New York had rejected the requirement. See Long Island Lighting Co.
v. General Elec. Co., 712 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
132. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 358 (3d Cir. 1989). Rose involved civil rights section 1983
claims and RICO sections 1962(a), (c), and (d) claims filed by the plaintiffs, former county em-
ployees, against the defendants, county and political party officials. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants had illegally obtained grand jury presentments against them. The section 1962(a)
analysis was a small, cursory part of the Tenth Circuit's analysis. The court, however, affirmed a
district court dismissal of that claim for lack of any allegation of investment injury. Id. at 357-58.
133. Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 820 (1989). In Grider, the plaintiff, Grider, brought two section 1962(a) claims against the
defendant, Texas Oil & Gas Corporation, alleging that the defendant had engaged in two oil-and-
gas-fraud schemes involving mail fraud. The Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court grant of the
defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that a plaintiff must allege investment injury in order to
state a civil section 1962(a) claim. Because the plaintiff only alleged injury from the scheme itself,
rather than any resulting investment or use, dismissal was appropriate. Id. See Sorenson, supra
note 11, at 1215, for a more complete discussion of the Grider case in particular.
134. Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., 941 F.2d 1220, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
135. Busby v. Crown Supply, 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990). For other commentary on the
Busby case in particular, see Miskimon, supra note 11, at 771-74.
136. Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut., 900 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 1990) (reserv-
ing judgment on the investment injury issue until squarely faced with it). Dana Corp. was decided
by a three-judge panel. See id. at 883.
In Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., however, handed down on the same day as Dana Corp., a
different three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit strongly suggested in dicta that it would require
investment injury. See Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 494 (6th Cir. 1990). The
Craighead court rejected a section 1962(a) civil RICO claim because the plaintiffs had failed to
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indecisiveness on the issue. No expressed, disposition, or even expressed indeci-
plead the predicate acts of fraud with sufficient particularity. Id. The court wen't on to state:
If plaintiffs had alleged the necessary predicate acts, their section 1962(a) claim
would still fail because they have not alleged injuries stemming directly from the
defendants' alleged use or investment oftheir illegally obtained income .... [Section
1962(a)] requires such a separate and traceable injury, and plaintiffs have alleged
only injuries traceable to the alleged predicate acts.
Id.; see also Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, 888 F.2d 385, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1989) (remanding a
section 1962(a) claim to allow the plaintiff the opportunity to establish investment injury), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 910 (1990).
Recently, a district court within the Sixth Circuit relied on Craighead as authority for the
investment injury requirement being accepted in the jurisdiction. See Nagel v. First of Mich.
Corp., No. 89-Cv-1 14, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16192, at *31 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 1990) (requir-
ing investment injury but finding that the plaintiff had in fact alleged such injury).
137. Mid-State Fertilizer v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333, 1340 (7th Cir. 1989) (Rip-
ple, J., concurring). The court in Mid-State Fertilizer rejected a RICO plaintiff's allegations of
predicate acts and therefore affirmed the district court's summary judgment on RICO claims
without addressing the investment injury question. Mid-State Fertilizer, 877 F.2d at 1337. The
district court had rejected an investment injury requirement. Mid-State Fertilizer v. Exchange
Nat'l Bank, 693 F. Supp. 666, 672-73 (N.D. III. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 1333
(7th Cir. 1989).
Judge Ripple cautioned in his concurring opinion that "this disposition ought not to be read as
our deciding sub silentio the important question of whether Mid-State has standing to bring an
action under subsection (a) of section 1962." Mid-State Fertilizer, 877 F.2d at 1340 (Ripple, J.,
concurring). The standing question to which Judge Ripple refers is the investment injury issue.
See id. at 1340-41 n.l (Ripple, J., concurring); see also Blakey & Perry, supra note 17, at 864
n.29 (citing Judge Ripple's opinion in Mid-State Fertilizer as authority for the investment injury
issue being unsettled in the Seventh Circuit). Because the Seventh Circuit was affirming on other
grounds a district court opinion that had rejected the investment injury requirement, Judge Rip-
ple's cautionary statement may indicate an acceptance of the requirement on his part.
The Seventh Circuit has examined standing/causation issues in the context of actions under
section 1962(c). See Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1987). In Pate,
the court rejected a requirement that a plaintiff allege injury by reason of at least two predicate
acts or by reason of all predicate acts. Id. at 809. The Fourth Circuit cited Pate in support of the
proposition that the language of sections 1962(a) and 1964(c) do not demand an investment in-
jury requirement. Busby v. Crown Supply, 896 F.2d 833, 838 (4th Cir. 1990).
The positions of the district courts within the Seventh Circuit are examined infra note 144.
138. Reddy v. Litton Indus., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W.
3057 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1991) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a RICO action based on
wrongful employee termination), Like the Sixth Circuit panel in Dana Corp., discussed supra note
136, the Ninth Circuit in Reddy felt the facts of the case did not demand resolution of the invest-
ment injury requirement. Reddy, 912 F.2d at 296. The Reddy court noted the four-circuit split on
the issue and stated, "[T]his circuit has not yet decided whether a plaintiff must show injury by
reason of his use or investment of racketeering income, or if the injury caused by the predicate
acts of racketeering is sufficient [to bring a section 1962(a) action]." Id.
There had been some remote indication before Reddy that the Ninth Circuit might favor rejec-
tion of the investment injury rule. See Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 529
(9th Cir. 1987). The plaintiffs' brief in Ouaknine v. MacFarlane asserted that because the Ninth
Circuit decided Wilcox (a section 1962(a) case) based on Sedima, the Ninth Circuit had implic-
itly rejected a 1962(a) investment injury requirement. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 42 n.33,
Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 89-7668). Of course, Reddy firmly
establishes that the Ninth Circuit is undecided on the issue.
Within the Ninth Circuit, two districts have taken positions on the investment injury require-
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sion on the investment injury requirement is found in the First,1"9 Fifth,1 4 0
Eighth,"' Eleventh,1 4 2 or Federal Circuits.
Within the undecided circuits, there also exists a split on the district court
level.14 8 The district courts within the Seventh Circuit have been especially
divided on the issue, with prominent judges taking opposite positions.14 ' Thus,
ment. The Northern District of California thus far has consistently required investment injury.
See Chemical Device Corp. v. American Cyanamid Co., No. C-89-1739 WHO, [1988-90 Transfer
Binder) RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) 7429 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 11, 1990) (denying section
1962(a) standing to victims of predicate mail and wire fraud); In re Rexplore, Inc. Secs. Litig.,
685 F. Supp. 1132, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (denying section 1962(a) standing to investors injured
by predicate securities fraud).
The Eastern and Central Districts of California thus far have rejected the requirement. See
Occupational-Urgent Care Health Sys. v. Sutro & Co., 711 F. Supp. 1016, 1023 (E.D. Cal.
1989); In re National Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificates Secs. Litig., 682 F.
Supp. 1073, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (fearing the investment injury requirement would be a retreat
to the special injury requirements rejected by the Supreme Court).
139. Within the First Circuit, both the District of Puerto Rico and the District of Massachu-
setts thus far have required investment injury. See Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 727 F. Supp. 759,
771 (D.P.R. 1989) (holding that an injury consisting of being defrauded of funds does not confer
section 1962(a) standing); Eastern Corporate Fed. Credit Union v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 639 F. Supp. 1532, 1537 (D. Mass. 1986) (same, denying standing to investors in bank);
Econo-Car Int'l v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 589 F. Supp. 1368, 1372 (D. Mass. 1984) (dismissing
claim where no reasonable juror could find investment caused plaintiff's injury).
140. Within the Fifth Circuit, only the Eastern District of Louisiana has considered the invest-
ment injury issue. That court rejected the requirement. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781, 806 (E.D. La. 1986). The Louisiana Power & Light
court was willing to rely heavily on the policy goal of reaching corporate defendants in rejecting
the investment injury requirement. Id.
141. Within the Eighth Circuit, only the District of Minnesota has considered the investment
injury issue. That court required allegation of investment injury. See Airlines Reporting Corp. v.
Barry, 666 F. Supp. 1311, 1314-15 (D. Minn. 1987) (denying standing to victims of an airline
ticket scam who did not allege investment injury).
142. Within the Eleventh Circuit, only the Southern District of Florida has considered the
investment injury issue. That court rejected the requirement. See Avirgan v. Hull, 691 F. Supp.
1357, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 1988), affd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991). The Avirgan court relied
heavily on its perception of the policy goals of RICO and on the liberal construction clause. Id.
143. See supra notes 135-42 (chronicling the positions of many of the district courts within
undecided circuits).
144. The divided case law on the investment injury requirement from district courts within the
Seventh Circuit has been prolific. Judges in the Northern District of Illinois have disagreed signifi-
cantly on the issue.
Judge Shadur has been a strong proponent of the investment injury requirement. In P.M.F.
Services v. Grady, 681 F. Supp. 549 (N.D. 11. 1988), Judge Shadur dismissed an investor's sec-
tion 1962(a) action against a bank that retained racketeering profits and invested them. Id. at
555. The investor had not alleged any injury from the investment, only from the original predicate
acts of mail fraud. Id.; see also Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod. Co., No. 86 C 7543,
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45, at '17 (N.D. I11. Jan. 7, 1987) (accepting, without extensive discus-
sion, the investment injury requirement and rejecting the claim of the plaintiff, an investor, who
could not allege injury from the defendant's use or investment). Judge Shadur's approach to in-
vestment injury has been specifically criticized by Professor Blakey and Mr. Perry. See Blakey &
Perry, supra note 17, at 863 n.29.
Judge Bua, recently retired, also had required investment injury in section 1962(a) actions and
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not only the Supreme Court's lack of disposition, but also the refusal of cer-
penned an influential opinion on the subject. See Palumbo v. I.M. Simon & Co., 701 F. Supp.
1407, 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also Craig v. First Am. Capital Resources, 740 F. Supp. 530,
537 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (declining to reconsider Palumbo, noting majority acceptance of the invest-
ment injury requirement); Grove Fresh Distribs. v. Flavor Fresh Foods, 720 F. Supp. 714, 716
(N.D. II1. 1989) (same).
Judge Plunkett as well has consistently required investment injury. See Prasinos v. National
Mortgage Bank, No. 89 C 5378, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15049, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1990)
(rejecting the defendants' motion for interlocutory appeal to allow the Seventh Circuit to consider
the investment injury issue); Illinois v. Flisk, 702 F. Supp. 189, 193 (N.D. II1. 1988) (holding that
where the State Department of Revenue brought a civil RICO claim involving unpaid taxes, the
use of those funds to pay employees did not constitute actionable injury for the Department);
Flood v. Waste Management, No. 87 C 4643, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 629, at *16 (N.D. I11. Jan.
21, 1988); Village of Fox Lake v. Waste Management, No. 86 C 4888, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1593, at "16 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 1987).
Other opinions in the Northern District of Illinois requiring investment injury include Midwest
Grinding Co. v. Spitz, 716 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (N.D. III. 1989) (Rovner, J.) (denying section
1962(a) standing to a plaintiff harmed by a fraudulent overcharging scheme but not by any subse-
quent investment); Grove Fresh Distribs. v. Everfresh Juice Co., Nos. 89 C 1118, 1117, 1113,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14147, at *11 (N.D. III. Nov. 27, 1989) (Zagel, J.) (rejecting sua sponte
a claim alleging injury only from predicate fraud, not from any subsequent investment of pro-
ceeds); Latigo Ventures v. Laventhol & Horwath, No. 85 C 9584, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11225,
at *7 (N.D. III, Nov. 27, 1987) (Duff, J.) (accepting the investment injury requirement without
extensive analysis and denying standing to plaintiff investors who could not allege same).
Judge Hart has led Northern District judges in rejecting the investment injury requirement. He
authored a key opinion on the issue. See Mid-State Fertilizer v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 693 F.
Supp. 666, 672 (N.D. III. 1988), a.ff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1989). He
recently reaffirmed his position. See In re Conticommodity Servs., Inc. Secs. Reg., 733 F. Supp.
1555, 1566 (N.D. III. 1990). Judge Hart's analysis has been specifically followed by Judge
Marovich. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Youtzy, No. 88 C 10562, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 1990) (recognizing the split over the investment injury requirement but ac-
cepting Judge Hart's analysis in Mid-State Fertilizer).
For other opinions in the Northern District of Illinois rejecting an investment injury require-
ment, see Matlock Fertilizer Co. v. Bost, No. 87 C 3946, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1995, at *15
(N.D. III. Feb. 27, 1989) (Parsons, J.) (relying heavily on the liberal construction clause to reject
the requirement); Continental Grain Co. v. Pullman Standard, 690 F. Supp. 628, 633 (N.D. Il1.
1988) (Leinenweber, J.) (relying on analogous section 1964(c) precedent to reject the require-
ment); Pitalis v. Skokie Trust & Say. Bank, No. 85 C 8596, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3161, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 1987) (Holderman, J.) (dismissing section 1962(a) claim against a bank where
plaintiff alleged no injury from subsequent investment).
Two judges have avoided disposition of the issue. Judge Kocoras almost faced the investment
injury issue in a suit involving fraudulent transfer of postage stamps. See Buckley Dement, Inc. v,
Perez, No. 90 C 2414, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11102, at *19 (N.D. I11. Aug. 23, 1990). Because
the plaintiffs in that case failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity, Judge Kocoras did not
reach the investment injury requirement. Id. He hinted that he would require investment injury by
referring to the "rather conclusory fashion" with which the plaintiff asserted that injury from the
predicate acts would be enough to gain standing. See id. at *10. Similarly, Chief Judge Moran,
when faced with the argument, dismissed it as untimely pled. J.D. Marshall Int'l v. Redstart, Inc.,
No. 86 C 371, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15758, at *11 (N.D. III. Dec. 29, 1989), affid, 935 F.2d
815 (7th Cir. 1991).
In the Central District of Illinois, Judge Mills has considered the issue and has required invest-
ment injury. See Forkin v. Paine Webber, Inc., Nos. 87-3197, 87-3191 [1988-89 Transfer Binder]
1322 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,129 (C.D. 11. Nov. 23, 1988) (denying recovery for losses
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tain circuit courts to dispose of the issue has left the federal judiciary split on
the investment injury issue." ' Two recent circuit court cases exemplify the
split.
In Ouaknine v. MacFarlane," 6 the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff must
allege investment injury in order to have standing to sue in a civil RICO sec-
tion 1962(a) action.147 Conversely, the Fourth Circuit in Busby v. Crown Sup-
ply,148 focusing on the same interpretive issues as the Second Circuit, rejected
the investment injury requirement in section 1962(a) actions.14 9 Both decisions
were published in February of 1990.
These two decisions focused on the same interpretive issues, without dis-
agreeing substantially on the proper approach to the question. Therefore, ex-
amining these two cases will bring to light the bases of the interpretive split. 150
C. Ouaknine v. MacFarlane: The Second Circuit Adopts the Investment
Injury Requirement
In Ouaknine, the Second Circuit faced the investment injury issue in a
incurred by victims of securities fraud).
145. Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit has also left its district courts divided on another contro-
versial area of RICO: the correct point of accrual for private civil claims. While the Supreme
Court has determined that the civil RICO statute of limitations is four years, Agency Holding
Corp v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 146 (1987), the Court has left the determination of
the point of accrual to a divided lower federal judiciary. See Mary S. Humes, RICO and a Uni-
form Point of Accrual, 99 YALE L.J. 1399, 1401-02 (1990); Paul B. O'Neill, Note, Mother of
Mercy, Is This the Beginning of RICO?: The Proper Point of Accrual of a Private Civil RICO
Action, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 172, 174-75 (1990). The Seventh Circuit has not yet resolved the issue.
South Chicago Bank v. Notaro, No. 90 C 6357, 1991 WL 21185, at *5 (N.D. 111. Feb. 12, 1991)
("[T]he Seventh Circuit has not yet ruled on the [civil RICO accrual] issue.").
Many judges within the Seventh Circuit have adopted the "last predicate act" rule: A civil
RICO action accrues upon the last predicate act in the relevant pattern. See Norris v. Wirtz, 703
F. Supp. 1322, 1326 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Citicorp Say. of I11. v. Streit, No. 84 C 7471, 1987 WL
9318, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 1987); County of Cook v. Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433, 433-35 (N.D.
Ill. 1986); Newman v. Wanland, 651 F. Supp. 20, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1986); see also South Chicago
Bank, 1991 WL 21185, at *5 (listing other cases adopting the last predicate act rule).
Most other judges within the circuit have adopted the "discovery" rule: A civil RICO action
accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should discover the injury being sued upon. See South
Chicago Bank, 1991 WL 21185, at *5-6 (adopting the rule and listing other cases so holding); In
re VMS Secs. Litig., 752 F. Supp. 1373, 1389 (N.D. Il. 1990).
146. 897 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990).
147. Id. at 83.
148. 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990).
149. Id. at 841.
150. As Busby is the only circuit court case rejecting the investment injury requirement, this
Comment uses that case to flesh out that position. The Comment uses Ouaknine, the Second
Circuit's decision, to examine the position favoring the investment injury requirement both be-
cause it was the most recent case on that position during the writing, and because it was the most
extensive appellate court analysis concluding that the investment injury requirement is warranted.
Since completion of this project, the D.C. Circuit adopted the investment injury requirement. See
Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., 941 F.2d 1220, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The
Ouaknine court's analysis, however, still remains the most extensive.
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RICO claim arising out of complicated, multi-party real estate transactions. 15'
The court read RICO's language and Supreme Court interpretation of that
language as directing the adoption of the investment injury requirement.152
The court also was unwilling to adopt an overly liberal construction of RICO
and its intended reach that would contradict the court's reading of the text.'5 8
1. Facts and Procedural History
Ouaknine v. MacFarlane involved RICO, securities fraud, and pendent
state claims.' The plaintiffs, Ouaknine and a development company, alleged
that multiple defendants made false representations to induce their invest-
ments. The plaintiffs further alleged the defendants' activities constituted a
pattern of racketeering and that the defendants then invested the proceeds
from racketeering in an enterprise, thereby violating section 1962(a).'55 The
plaintiffs also alleged injury, but only from the predicate fraudulent represen-
tations, and not from any subsequent use or investment of the proceeds. 56
The district court ruled in favor of all defendants, dismissing the section
1962(a) RICO claim for failure to meet the investment injury requirement.157
The plaintiffs appealed.
2. Justification of the Investment Injury Requirement
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that to state a claim
for civil damages under section 1962(a), a plaintiff must allege injury arising
from the defendants' investment of racketeering income in an enterprise. 5 8
Because the district court held that Ouaknine had not alleged any facts estab-
lishing that the injury arose from the defendants' investment, only injury from
the predicate fraud, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the section
1962(a) claim.' 50
The Second Circuit essentially examined three sources to interpret sections
1962(a) and 1964(c): the plain language of the statute;'"" the precedential
effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.; 6
151. Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 77-78. The plaintiff Ouaknine subscribed to stock in a plaintiff
corporation established for investment in a real estate project. Defendants gave Ouaknine false
assurances to get his approval on further transactions and to get him to take a nonrecourse note
instead of cash. Id. at 78.
152. Id. at 82-83.
153. Id. at 83.
154. Id. at 77.
155. Id. at 77-79.
156. Id.
157. Id. The court also dismissed the section 1962(c) RICO claim based on predicate securities
fraud, the securities fraud counts, and the state-law claims based on fraud, for failure to plead
fraud with particularity. Id.
158. Id. at 83.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 82-83.
161. Id. at 83 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)).
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and the remedial purpose of RICO as expressed in its "liberal construction
clause" and as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Sedima.
162
a. RICO's language
The Second Circuit noted that, in analyzing a statute, the primary source
for interpretation is the statutory language.16 The court emphasized that sec-
tion 1964(c) authorizes recovery for injuries "by reason of a violation of sec-
tion 1962."16' Then, looking at section 1962(a), the court noted that its lan-
guage provides that "[iut shall be unlawful for [a person who has received
income from a pattern of racketeering] ... to invest ... [that] income ... in
[the enterprise]. '"65
The Second Circuit maintained that a violation of section 1962(a) is the
actual use or investment of income derived from a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity.166 Mere participation in the predicate acts of racketeering does not es-
tablish the violation.1 67 Thus, the court viewed the "plain language" of the
statute as calling for the investment injury requirement.166
162. Id. at 75.
163. Id. at 82.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 82-83.
The Third Circuit's acceptance of the investment injury requirement relied in part on the fact
that a majority of courts, thus far, had so ruled. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 357 (1989). Its
own analysis was limited to the conclusion that "the allegation of income use or investment injury
'is consistent with both the literal language and the fair import of the language (of section
1962(a)].'" Id. at 358 (quoting P.M.F. Servs. v. Grady, 681 F. Supp. 549, 555 (N.D. 111. 1988)).
The Tenth Circuit also relied on the statute's "plain language" in requiring investment injury.
The court, in Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
820 (1989), asserted that RICO "does not state that it is unlawful to receive racketeering income;
rather ... the statute prohibits a person who has received such income from using or investing it
in the proscribed manner." Id. at 1149.
Professor Blakey and Mr. Perry find another piece of evidence in the language of the statute
that, according to them, suggests courts should reject the investment injury requirement. They
argue that because section 1962(a) "not only requires 'use or invest,' but also requires that the
person be a principal in the racketeering activity . . . [the violation of section 1962(a)] requires
both 'racketeering activity' and 'use or invest . . . .' Injury by either would, therefore, be injury 'by
reason of a violation of section 1962 .... " Blakey & Perry, supra note 17, at 864 n.29 (citation
omitted). Under this analysis, the fact that the predicate acts are elements of the violation means
that injuries from the predicate acts alone are recoverable.
This Comment later argues that Blakey and Perry's statutory analysis does not address the real
issue of whether that participation as a principal is part of the violation and therefore can cause
injuries recoverable under section 1964(c). See infra text accompanying note 247 (rebutting
Blakey and Perry's analysis). Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that section 1962(a)'s clause,
"in which such person has participated as a principal," 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988), applies to the
phrase "pattern of racketeering activity," id. § 1961(5). See Hilary S. Schultz, Note, Investing
Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 1491,
1496 (1974) (asserting "[t]he inclusion of the clause 'in which such person has participated as a
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b. The effect of Sedima
The plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima strongly
suggested that an investment injury requirement did not belong in section
1962(a) actions.169 In Sedima, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs institut-
ing civil actions under section 1962(c) need not allege injury "separate from
the harm from the predicate acts." ' The plaintiffs in Ouaknine had pointed
to the Sedima Court's statement that "[i]f the defendant engages in a pattern
of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by [section 1962(a)-(c)], and
the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the
plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c). 171
The Ouaknine court acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Sedima had
interpreted the language of section 1962(c) broadly.172 Still, the Ouaknine
court held Sedima did not control the disposition of a section 1962(a) claim. 178
The Ouaknine court limited Sedima to the specific subsection of section 1962
at issue in that case, noting that "the Court was dealing only with that section
[1962(c)] of RICO."' The subtle linguistic distinction between sections
1962(a) and 1962(c) allowed the court to limit Sedima squarely to its facts. 78
Section 1962(c) prohibits the conducting of affairs through a pattern of racke-
teering activity. Thus, the predicate acts of racketeering will normally consti-
tute the violation.' 7 6 In section 1962(a), on the other hand, the pattern of
racketeering is not, under the Second Circuit's analysis, what constitutes the
violation. 77 That section prohibits use or investment of funds that have been
received through a pattern of racketeering. 78
The Ouaknine court also noted that the Sedima decision rejected a narrow
reading of section 1962(c) because "the essence of the violation [of section
1962(c)] is the commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an
enterprise."1 '7 Because, according to the court, the "essence" of a violation of
section 1962(a) is not the commission of predicate acts but the investment of
racketeering income, the Sedima holding again did not contradict the invest-
principal' was presumably intended to clear up ... ambiguity, but it is not clear from the place-
ment of the clause in the statute whether it modifies 'a pattern of racketeering activity' as well as
'the collection of an unlawful debt,' or just the latter phrase"). But see Rakoff, supra note 56, §
1.06[1] (adopting the broader reading of the "participated as a principle" clause).
169. Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 83.
170. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985); see also supra notes 97-101
and accompanying text (discussing Sedima).








179. Id. (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497).
[Vol. 41:475
CIVIL RICO SECTION 1962(A)
ment injury requirement. 180
The court also relied on the statement in Sedima that a "'plaintiff only has
standing if ... he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct
constituting the violation.' '"81 The Ouaknine court viewed the "conduct con-
stituting the violation" of section 1962(a) to be the investment of racketeering
income. 82 The Second Circuit, therefore, read Sedima as not demanding the
rejection of the investment injury requirement, and surprisingly was able to
read into that opinion the necessity of adopting the requirement.1 88
In short, the Second Circuit's analysis of Sedima limited the effect of that
opinion to section 1962(c) actions, and rejected the theory that the broad lan-
guage of the opinion covered section 1962(a) actions as well. Further, the Sec-
ond Circuit's analysis of Sedima's "essence of the violation" language allowed
it to read Sedima as prescribing the investment injury requirement.
c. The purpose of RICO
The Second Circuit considered the effect of the liberal construction clause in
its analysis of the legislative intent of Congress in enacting RICO. RICO's
"liberal construction clause" states that its provisions are to be "liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes." '84 The Sedima Court had relied in
part on that congressional directive, 185 and asserted further that "[t]he stat-
ute's 'remedial purposes' are nowhere more evident than in the provision of
private action for those injured by racketeering activity. '18 6
The Second Circuit rejected Ouaknine's argument that this statutory provi-
sion and judicial gloss demand the rejection of the investment injury require-
ment.187 The court granted that RICO is to be construed broadly, but would
not read that general directive as overriding a limitation found in the explicit
text of the statute. 88
By not extending the explicit text of the RICO statute, the court was able to
conclude that recovery under section 1962(a) does require investment in-
jury. 8 9 Because the plaintiffs could not allege such injury,"'6 only injury from
180. Id.
181. Id. (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496) (emphasis added by the Ouaknine court).
182. Id.
183. Id.
The Tenth Circuit rejected a broad reading of Sedima as well, also relying on the fact that the
case was dealing only with section 1962(c) actions. Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d
1147, 1150 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989).
184. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
185. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985).
186. Id.
187. Ouaknine. 897 F.2d at 83.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. A plaintiff could conceivably meet the investment injury requirement, although it is diffi-
cult. SMITH & REED. supra note 48, 5.02.
One inventive way to meet the investment injury requirement is to allege that the proceeds of a
19921
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the predicate fraud, the court affirmed the dismissal of the section 1962(a)
claim.19
D. Busby v. Crown Supply: The Fourth Circuit Rejects the Investment
Injury Requirement
In Busby, the Fourth Circuit, faced with the issue of investment injury in
the context of an employer-fraud RICO claim, disagreed with the Second,
Third, and Tenth Circuits. The court held that RICO's language, purpose, and
Supreme Court interpretations all warrant a rejection of the investment injury
requirement.192
1. Facts and Procedural History
The plaintiff, Busby, suing on behalf of himself and all current and former
sales representatives of the defendant, Crown Supply, Inc. ("Crown"), alleged
that Crown and a subsequent owner of Crown's business formulated a scheme
of false representation while he was their sales representative. 93 More specifi-
cally, Busby alleged that Crown would understate the profit upon which sales
representatives' commissions were based.9
Busby sued under sections 1962(a), 1962(c), and 1964(c) of RICO.198 The
district court dismissed the section 1962(a) claims on the grounds that the
plaintiff failed to allege any investment injury.'96
pattern of racketeering were invested in the enterprise that engaged in the pattern of racketeering.
A plaintiff would allege further injury from the continuation of the enterprise, which was made
possible by the internal investment of racketeering proceeds. At least one court has accepted such
internal investment injury as satisfying the investment injury requirement. See Blue Cross v. Nar-
done, 680 F. Supp. 195, 197-98 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
The reason this "internal investment" theory at times may not appear appropriate is that the
injury may flow from the kinds of criminal activity that are RICO predicate acts-for example,
mail fraud and wire fraud. Having just decided injury from predicate acts is not sufficient to bring
a section 1962(a) civil action, a court may not want to let a plaintiff in the "back door" to recov-
ery for injury from those sorts of predicate acts.
Nevertheless, if the litigation focuses on the factual causation issue of whether the plaintiff was
injured by reason of a RICO violation, then the allegation of internal investment injury must
confer standing for a section 1962(a) claim. See Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod.
Corp., No. 86 C 7543, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45, at *18-19 (N.D. Ill. Jan 8, 1987).
The crimes of the perpetuated criminal enterprise are not predicate acts for the purposes of a
plaintiff's allegations. They are actions that happen to be listed in the statute as RICO predicate
acts, but that are not alleged as such in the plaintiff's complaint. If a plaintiff can establish the
causation from the RICO violation to the injury, the plaintiff should be free to proceed. Contra
Sorenson, supra note 11, at 1235-36.
191. Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 83.
192. Busby v. Crown Supply, 896 F.2d 833, 83.7 (4th Cir. 1990).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. The plaintiff also attached two pendant state-law claims. Id.
196. Id. at 835-36. The district court also dismissed all RICO counts for failure to state a
claim, ruling that plaintiff's RICO allegations failed to establish a pattern of racketeering activity.
Id. at 835. The district court suggested that dismissal also might be required because the com-
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2. Rejection of the Investment Injury Requirement
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding, among other rul-
ings,1"7 that section 1962(a) actions carry no investment injury requirement. 198
Although the Fourth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion as the Second
Circuit, the Fourth Circuit in Busby nevertheless looked at essentially the
same interpretive tools: RICO's language, 99 Supreme Court precedent,"" and
legislative purpose.20'
a. RICO's language
Like the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit began its analysis by stating
that, if unambiguous, the explicit language of the RICO statute is determina-
tive.2 02 That language, the court maintained, does not require investment
injury.203
The court emphasized that a violation of section 1962(a) contains two sepa-
rate elements: "(a) receipt of income from a pattern of racketeering activity,
and (b) the use or investment of this income in an enterprise. 20 4 These are
the two events that must occur before section 1962(a) is violated.
The court held that the civil recovery provision does not limit recovery to
injuries flowing from the second prong of a section 1962(a) violation.20 5 The
court noted that injuries, as a factual matter, can flow both from the predicate
plaint named Crown and the subsequent owner as defendants and pointed to a division of Crown
as the "enterprise" in the RICO violation. See id. at 835-36.
197. The court also disposed of pattern and person/enterprise issues. Based on the Supreme
Court's holding in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), discussed supra
notes 112-18 and accompanying text, the court and the parties agreed that the plaintiffs had
alleged a pattern of racketeering. Busby, 896 F.2d at 836. The court would not consider the
constitutionality of RICO because it had not been litigated in the district court. Id.
The court, sitting en banc, reconsidered its person/enterprise holding in United States v. Com-
puter Sciences, 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983). Computer
Sciences had required the "person" and "enterprise" in section 1962(a) actions be distinct entities.
Id. at 1190. The Busby court was persuaded by circuit court opinions, especially the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.
1984), affd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985). Busby, 896 F.2d at 841. Busby overruled
Computer Sciences in so far as it had required this person/enterprise distinction in section
1962(a) actions. Id.
198. Busby, 896 F.2d at 837.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 839.
201. Id. at 838.
202. Id. at 837 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983) ("[A]bsent ambigu-
ity or a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, [the] statutory language is
conclusive.")).
203. Id. The court noted that other courts had required investment injury based on the statu-
tory language of section 1962(a). Id. (citing Grider v.Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147,




racketeering acts and the investment of the racketeering income.206 The court
therefore recognized recovery for whatever part of the RICO violation, as the
court defined it, caused the injury.
b. The effect of Sedima and Haroco
The Fourth Circuit used Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.2"7 and its compan-
ion case, American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc.,"'8 in the exact
manner criticized by the Second Circuit in Ouaknine.209
According to the Fourth Circuit, the passage in Sedima stating, in terms
applying to section 1962 in its entirety, that injury from predicate racketeering
acts is actionable under section 1964(c),210 was evidence that the Supreme
Court would grant standing in a section 1962(a) action without investment
injury.21' Because Sedima's language refers generally to section 1962, the
Fourth Circuit read the section 1962(c) analysis in Sedima as syllogistically
working from the general statement that injuries from section 1962 predicate
acts warrant civil recovery to the conclusion that injuries from section 1962(c)
predicate acts warrant civil recovery. Thus, the Fourth Circuit did not read
Sedima as an analysis of the language of section 1962(c), but as a broad state-
ment about the nature of civil RICO recovery. The fact that Sedima was a
section 1962(c) case did not, therefore, restrict the logical effect of its lan-
guage. The Fourth Circuit held that the logic of Sedima applies equally to
section 1962(a) and 1962(c) claims.2 12
The court also relied on similar language from another section 1962(c) case,
American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc. The Busby court noted
that in Haroco, the Supreme Court rejected "[t]he submission that the injury
must flow not from the predicate acts themselves" but rather from the "con-
duct of an enterprise. 12 " The Busby court read this language as rejecting a
special injury requirement in any civil RICO claims. The Busby court there-
fore applied the language and logic of Haroco to section 1962(a) actions. 1 '
206. Id. at 837-38. The court appeared to recognize some controversy as to whether injury by
reason of the predicate acts alone ever arose. The court asserted that some courts had assumed
that predicate acts cannot cause injury. Id.; see also Avirgan v. Hull, 691 F. Supp. 1357, 1362
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that a defendant's conduct can injure a RICO plaintiff through the use
or investment of the racketeering income and by the "operation of the enterprise"); G. Robert
Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technol-
ogy Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 586 n.237 (1987) (asserting that when racketeering activity produces
income and that income is invested, injury may occur in various ways).
207. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
208. 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
209. See supra notes 169-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's interpre-
tation of Sedima.).
210. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495.
211. Busby, 896 F.2d at 839.
212. Id. at 839-40.
213. Id. (quoting Haroco, 473 U.S. at 609).
214. Id. at 839.
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The Busby court acknowledged that the direct precedential value of both of
these Supreme Court cases is limited, as both cases dealt explicitly only with
section 1962(c) claims, not 1962(a) claims.2 15 The court contended, however,
that "it is clear that the Supreme Court was referring to [section] 1962 as a
whole in both cases, and in fact cited [section] 1962(a) and the offense it
defines in Sedima. 2 1 6
c. The purpose of RICO
The Busby court also contended that the investment injury requirement con-
flicts with RICO's "liberal construction clause. ' 21 ' The court noted that this
clause had been used by the Supreme Court to support broad applications of
RICO.
219
The Fourth Circuit maintained that the investment injury requirement vio-
lates congressional intent because Congress intended RICO to cover not only
organized crime but also legitimate corporations engaged in racketeering ac-
tivity.2 9 The investment injury rule, in conjunction with the section 1962(c)
person/enterprise distinction, 220 would essentially eliminate such corporate lia-
bility.2 The Fourth Circuit further argued that in bringing a section 1962(a)
action against a corporate defendant, it is virtually impossible to prove injury
flowing from investment.222 The predicate acts, often mail or wire fraud, usu-
ally produce the injury sued upon.22 8 Thus, the broad remedial purpose of
RICO would be frustrated by imposing the investment injury requirement.22'
The court acknowledged that problems may arise from RICO's breadth, but
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 838.
218. Id. The court noted three instances of Supreme Court use of the liberal construction
clause: Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492 n.10 (1985) ("[I]f Congress' liberal-
construction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in section 1964, where RICO's remedial
purposes are most evident."); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983) (using legislative
history to support a broad use of the criminal forfeiture provision); United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (same; applying to the enterprise requirement). Busby, 896 F.2d at 838.
219. Busby, 896 F.2d at 838 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587) ("[Insulating
the wholly criminal enterprise from prosecution under RICO is the more incongruous position
[given RICO's language and legislative history]."); Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise
Criminality: A Response to Gerald E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 786 (1988) (stating that
the prosecution of legitimate but criminal enterprises was a key congressional concern).
220. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text for an explanation of the section 1962(c)
person/enterprise distinction.
221. See Busby, 896 F.2d at 838-39.
222. Id. at 839; see also Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F.
Supp. 781, 806-07 (E.D. La. 1986). The Louisiana Power & Light court asserted that if courts
require investment injury then a plaintiff "will almost never prove a claim against a corporate
defendant." 642 F. Supp. at 806-07. The court feared that because of tracing problems, a plaintiff
would not be able to prove causation from the investment of the proceeds and the injury. Id.
223. Busby. 896 F.2d at 838.
224. Id.
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asserted it is the plain language of the statute that creates this breadth.225
Therefore, the court asserted, any corrections lie within the purview of
Congress. 22 6
According to the Fourth Circuit, because Busby alleged injury flowing from
predicate acts, he deserved to have his section 1962(a) claim analyzed in a
traditional proximate cause analysis, without any additional requirement that
the investment or use of racketeering income cause his injury.227 Thus, the
court reversed and remanded the dismissal of the section 1962(a) RICO
claim. 228
In summary, both the Second Circuit and the Fourth Circuit recently con-
sidered whether a plaintiff alleging injury from predicate racketeering activity,
and not from the subsequent use or investment of the racketeering proceeds,
may state a claim for civil damages under section 1962(a) of RICO. The Sec-
ond Circuit, aligning itself with the majority of federal courts, held that a
plaintiff would not have stated a claim under these circumstances. The court
held that RICO's language, its interpretation by the Supreme Court, and its
legislative purpose all urged such an investment injury requirement. The
Fourth Circuit, turning to those same sources of statutory construction, came
to the opposite conclusion, holding that injury from predicate acts is sufficient
to state a section 1962(a) claim.
III. ANALYSIS: THE SECTION 1962(A) INVESTMENT INJURY REQUIREMENT
IS AN ACCURATE READING OF RICO
The history of judicial limitations on RICO has been a history of courts
imposing restraints found neither in the language nor the legislative record of
the statute. Because of this history, a suspicion of new judicial limitations,
such as the investment injury requirement, is justified. Nonetheless, the plain
language of the statute does require investment injury in section 1962(a) ac-
tions. The interplay between sections 1962(a) and 1962(c), when examined
carefully, demands this result. Further, the precedential effect of Sedima,
while not entirely clear, cannot by itself require rejection of the investment
injury requirement.
A. The Justified Suspicion of Judicial Limits on RICO
When approaching the investment injury issue, a possible first reaction is to
suspect the kind of judicial tampering that the Supreme Court has consistently
rejected.229 Half of the Sedima decision was devoted to rejecting special racke-
teering requirements in section 1962(c) actions that were imposed by the Sec-
225. Id. at 839.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 840.
228. Id. at 834.
229. See supra notes 79-120 and accompanying text (discussing the efforts of lower federal
courts to find limits to RICO and the Supreme Court's rejection of those efforts).
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ond Circuit, a court that has authored the leading case supporting the section
1962(a) investment injury requirement. 80
Commentators suspicious of judicial tampering with the impact of the
breadth of RICO's plain language are understandably uncomfortable with
judges deciding whether a person is the kind of criminal that RICO was
meant to punish .23 They argue that any broad language in the statute should
not be "interpreted" out.282
Their argument is persuasive. RICO is a broad statute. Its language covers
a multitude of situations." For a court to impose limits based on its own
perceptions of the proper reach of the statute arguably is an improper use of
judicial power.28' While an inquiry into RICO's intended reach helps under-
stand the statute, it is not the first question that must be asked. The first
question is what RICO actually does cover by its language.
Undoubtedly, however, certain aspects of the statute have allowed applica-
tions to situations perhaps not conceived by Congress.285 The most glaring as-
pect is the inclusion of mail and wire fraud as predicate racketeering acts.28 6 A
limit on civil RICO actions that is legitimately found in the statute's language
therefore would, in most commentators' eyes, be welcome. Civil RICO's pri-
mary applications have been in areas to which many believe private federal
causes of action should not apply.287
The first question, nonetheless, is what the language of RICO says.2 8 It is
important to discuss the interpretation of the statute's language uninfluenced
by the controversy surrounding RICO. One must attempt to decide what the
linguistics of the statute actually accomplish.
B. Plain Language, Liberal Construction, and the Bottom Line: What Is a
"Violation"?
The language issue can be divorced from any policy debate lurking behind
RICO case law. Ascertaining the meaning of the term "violation," as used in
230. See Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990).
231. Blakey & Perry, supra note 17, at 864-65 ("To assert that an offender's treatment should
be determined by the color of a collar is contrary not only to the text and legislative history of the
statute, but also to our most basic premise of our jurisprudence: equal justice under law." (foot-
note omitted)).
232. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (Prof. G. Robert Blakey and Mr. Michael
Perry).
233. See supra note 26 (listing the predicate offenses included in RICO's definition of "racke-
teering activity").
234. See supra note 231.
235. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (discussing the use of RICO against "gar-
den-variety fraud").
236. See supra note 75 for support for the proposition that the inclusion of mail and wire fraud
as predicate acts has been the primary catalyst for the growth of civil RICO.
237. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
238. The leading majority and minority opinions on investment injury agree on this fundamen-
tal first step of analysis. See Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1990); Busby v.
Crown Supply, 896 F.2d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1990).
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section 1964(c), is the fundamental task in interpreting the language of RICO
regarding the investment injury requirement.289 The query is whether "viola-
tion" refers to predicate acts and the subsequent investment of income or
merely refers to the subsequent investment of income. When the courts that
have considered the investment injury issue turn to the language of the statute,
the result is two distinct views of the interplay between section 1962(a) and
section 1964(c).
The majority courts, which require investment injury, have a tendency to
concentrate on the phrases in section 1962(a), "[it shall be unlawful" and "to
use or invest." The courts hold that those phrases interplay such that the "vio-
lation" is the use or investment.2 40 The predicate acts, under this analysis,
serve only to establish under what circumstances the use or investment is
unlawful.
The minority courts prefer to view section 1962(a) as containing two dis-
tinct elements. A violation requires (1) predicate racketeering acts creating
income, and (2) the subsequent investment of that income.24' Either one of
these aspects of a violation would warrant civil recovery under this view. Nor-
mally this would mean that alleging injury from the predicate racketeering
acts themselves would be sufficient to state a cause of action under section
1962(a). The minority position, however, is flawed because it does not squarely
address the question of what constitutes a violation.
Section 1962(a) prohibits the use or investment of the proceeds of racke-
teering income." ' The predicate racketeering acts are elements in the sense
that a violation is logically impossible without their occurring at some time. 48
The predicate acts, however, are not the prohibited action under section
1962(a). They are not the verb that the statute has prohibited.
An illustration from an unrelated statute may help clarify. The Model Penal
Code prohibits the receipt of stolen property: "A person is guilty of theft if he
purposely receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing
that it has been stolen ... "2"4
Suppose a civil recovery provision were added to that prohibition that, like
section 1964(c) of RICO, allowed recovery for injury "by reason of a viola-
tion" of that prohibition. If a receipt of stolen property occurred, and a plain-
tiff attempted to recover for injuries by reason only of the original theft of the
property, an issue similar to the RICO investment injury issue would arise:
whether the theft is part of the violation.
It is clear in this example that the violation-the act that a person cannot
do-is to receive a certain kind of property. The violation is the receipt. Simi-
larly, what a person cannot do under section 1962(a) of RICO is to invest or
239. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
240. E.g., Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 82-83.
241. E.g., Busby, 896 F.2d at 837-38.
242. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
243. Busby, 896 F.2d at 837-38.
244. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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use a certain kind of income. Creating the stolen status of property is not in
violation of the prohibition against receipt of stolen property, and the gather-
ing of income through racketeering activity does not violate section 1962(a) of
RICO. Those actions merely created a situation in which illegality could
occur.
Those who oppose the investment injury requirement might reject the above
analysis, in part, because section 1962(a) demands that the income flow from
predicate acts in which the defendant "participated as a principal."' 4" Because
of this requirement, the argument runs, the predicate acts are more integral to




There is some dispute whether, under section 1962(a), a plaintiff must al-
lege that a defendant who has received income from a pattern of racketeering
activity "participated as a principal in that racketeering activity. ' '247 Even ac-
cepting that a plaintiff must allege such a connection under section 1962(a),
the distinction is still not valid.
The question is whether the creation of the income is part of the violation. It
is not. Regardless of who creates the income, the predicate acts and the subse-
quent investment are separate concepts in section 1962(a). It is unlawful to
invest a certain type of money-namely, the investor's own profits from racke-
teering. Racketeering profits can be thought of almost as instrumentalities in a
section 1962(a) violation. The creation of those profits, of the "instrumentali-
ties," however, is not the violation.
Nor is it relevant that injury may arise from predicate acts. 48 The relevant
question is whether that injury is compensable under civil RICO. Injury from
predicate acts alone, by the language of the statute, is not compensable.
Once it is determined that the plain, unambiguous language of sections
1962(a) and 1964(c) demands an investment injury requirement, the invest-
ment injury requirement is a necessity in civil RICO. The liberal construction
clause should come into play only if the language of the statute is ambiguous.
Certainly the statutory invitation to construe liberally is not an invitation to
apply the statute to cover activity not contemplated by the plain language. 49
The liberal construction clause would not warrant "interpreting in," for exam-
ple, extra predicate acts not listed in the statute. Nor does the liberal construc-
tion clause warrant interpreting in an extra violation for which civil recovery is
allowed. Because the interplay of sections 1962(a) and 1964(c) clearly pro-
duce an investment injury requirement, the requirement is valid.
245. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
246. See supra note 168 (noting Blakey and Perry's defense of the "participated as a principal"
argument).
247. See supra note 168.
248. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (noting the Busby court's conclusion that in-
jury can flow from both investment and predicate acts).
249. Even the Busby court acknowledged this much. See Busby v. Crown Supply, 896 F.2d
833, 837 (4th Cir. 1990).
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C. The Precedential Effect of Sedima
While the language of RICO requires investment injury for civil action
under section 1962(a), the issue of the effect of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.
still remains.
Sedima's only direct and binding precedent regarding injury requirements
applies to section 1962(c). The actual case before the Sedima Court concerned
only section 1962(c),5 0 and therefore the case can only have purported to ad-
dress source-of-injury issues regarding that section. Dicta in Sedima, however,
may support the proposition that injury resulting from predicate acts is enough
to have standing to bring a civil RICO action,6 1 a conclusion at odds with the
investment injury requirement.
The Sedima Court used general language concerning special injury require-
ments153 and then applied that general language to the 1962(c) setting.26 3
That application of the broad to the specific could apply to section 1962(a) as
well.
Sedima's general language here is unfortunate. Perhaps the Court, without
the benefit of the current lower-court jurisprudence on the investment injury
controversy, was not aware of the potential impact of such language. Specula-
tion aside, however, some language in Sedima is threatening to the investment
injury requirement.""
On the other hand, Sedima's reliance on predicate acts being the "essence
of the violation" of section 1962(c) leaves room to read the opinion as consis-
tent with the investment injury requirement." The predicate acts and opera-
tive verbs in section 1962(a) are separate in time and concept from each other:
one gains income, then one invests. The structure of section 1962(c) inter-
twines predicate act and operative verb 2" more closely: one conducts an enter-
prise through racketeering. This structure suggests that the essence of a sec-
tion 1962(c) violation may include predicate acts, while the essence of a
section 1962(a) violation hinges on what a person does with the racketeering
proceeds.
Because Sedima's effect on the investment injury issue is from dicta, and
that dicta is ambiguous, the case will continue to be interpreted by both sides
of the issue as supporting their position until the Supreme Court takes up the
250. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
251. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text (noting the Busby court's use of dicta in
Sedima to support the investment injury requirement).
252. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (quoting and commenting on the relevant
passages).
253. See supra note 210-12 and accompanying text (pointing out the Busby court's acceptance
of this syllogistic analysis).
254. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 105 (quoting the relevant passage).
256. See Eastern Corporate Fed. Credit Union v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 639 F. Supp.
1532, 1537 (D. Mass. 1986) ("Focusing on the operative verbs, § 1962(a) makes it unlawful for a
person to "use or invest" income derived through racketeering activity in the acquisition of an
interest in an enterprise.").
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issue directly. 5 In the face of a plain-language reading of the statute support-
ing the investment injury requirement, however, the ambiguity should be re-
solved in favor of the requirement.
If the Supreme Court does address the issue directly, the Court may be
influenced by its current hostility to RICO's breadth."8 However, the Court
also has been hostile to judicially imposed limitations.25 9 Current hostility to
RICO's breadth may result in a tendency to seize an opportunity to limit
RICO that is legitimately based in the text of the statute, satisfying the twin
desires of the Supreme Court.
Judicial limitations have, in the past, been perversions of the RICO statute.
The investment injury requirement, however, is an outgrowth of the only fair
reading of the text of the statute. The only legitimate reason for a lower court
to reject the requirement is the broad language in Sedima. That language,
however, is ambiguous and therefore should not outweigh the plain language
of the statute.
IV. IMPACT: A LIMIT ON THE USE OF CIVIL RICO
Civil RICO claims can be classified conceptually into two broad categories.
First, there are "garden-variety fraud" claims, cases arising out of an ordinary
commercial setting in which mail and/or wire fraud typically are used as
predicate acts. 60 Second, there are more serious claims revolving around
RICO's more serious predicate acts, 61 claims that might be directed at organ-
ized crime figures. The impact on these two types of violations will be consid-
ered separately. Also noted is a means of scuttling the impact of the invest-
ment injury requirement through the allegation of internal-investment injury.
A. "Garden Variety Fraud"
Requiring investment injury in section 1962(a) actions helps eliminate a
class of cases at the heart of the controversy surrounding RICO: cases employ-
ing as predicate acts mail and wire fraud committed by a corporate defendant.
This occurs as a result of the combined effect of the investment injury require-
ment in section 1962(a) actions and restrictions imposed upon section 1962(c)
actions.
As mentioned earlier, in section 1962(c) actions courts interpret RICO as
257. The closest the Supreme Court came to adjudicating the investment injury issue was when
it denied the plaintiff's request to grant certiorari after the Tenth Circuit adopted the rule. See
Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 493 U.S. 820, denying cert. to 868 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1989).
258. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (noting that four Justices recently ques-
tioned RICO's constitutionality).
259. See supra notes 79-120 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court has con-
sistently struck down artificial limitations).
260. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (explaining the "garden-variety fraud"
problem).
261. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (describing RICO's more serious predicate
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requiring that the "person" who controls the conduct of an "enterprise"
through a pattern of racketeering must be an entity distinct from that enter-
prise." ' The person/enterprise distinction clearly reduces a plaintiff's ability
to sue an individual entity for fraud using section 1962(c). In most instances, a
plaintiff can only reach an employee, not the deep pocket of the "enterprise"
whose affairs that employee is conducting.26
The investment injury requirement in section 1962(a) actions may eliminate
most mail and wire fraud claims brought under that section, at least against a
corporate defendant. Normally, it is the predicate mail or wire fraud, and not
the subsequent investment, that injures the victim.264
The combined effect of these two limitations, the person/enterprise distinc-
tion in section 1962(c) actions and the investment injury requirement in sec-
tion 1962(a) actions, is to limit RICO actions brought in ordinary commercial
settings. These claims are against a singular entity acting fraudulently. This
forecloses a section 1962(c) action. These claims are also alleging injury pri-
marily from the fraud itself. This forecloses a section 1962(a) action.
Professor Blakey and Mr. Perry have noted that the worst fear of those
opposing a restricted view of RICO, that RICO will not apply to white-collar
criminals, may be the result of this combined effect. They view these two steps
as jointly achieving a result not contemplated by Congress.2 ' 5 Mr. Smith and
Mr. Reed have observed the same effect of the investment injury requirement,
but praised that result as bringing civil RICO in line with the original con-
gressional intent.2 6 6 While the argument over the proper breadth of RICO
rages on, with no addition from this Comment, two conclusions are asserted:
the investment injury requirement is prescribed by the text of RICO, and the
investment injury requirement may effectively eliminate the more controversial
civil RICO cases involving commercial disputes.
262. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text (discussing the § 1962(c) person/enter-
prise distinction and its impact on RICO litigation).
263. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
264. P.M.F. Services. v. Grady, 681 F. Supp. 549, 555 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("[I]t is certainly true
that the victims of (say) mail fraud are most typically injured by the crimes themselves, not by
the criminal's use of the proceeds in the operation of an 'enterprise.' "); SMITH & REED, supra
note 48, 9T 4.04[5] (stating that "the potential of section 1962(a) for reaching the corporate deep
pockets has been thwarted .. .by the [investment injury requirement]").
265. Blakey & Perry, supra note 17, at 865 n.29. Blakey and Perry argue that:
Congress did not intend to confine RICO to organized crime or to preclude its appli-
cation to white-collar crime. That limitation, however, might be the effect of the
adoption of the person-enterprise rule under [section] 1962(c) and a narrowly defined
use or invest rule under [section] 1962(a). The courts would have in two steps
adopted a policy that Congress specifically declined to adopt when RICO was enacted
in 1970.
Id.
266. SMITH & REED, supra note 48, 91 6.04[5][a]. Smith and Reed stated that the investment
injury requirement "would serve a salutary role in restricting civil section 1962(a) actions to the
primary evil motivating Congress to enact section 1962(a) as a separate offense: the infiltration of
legitimate business by those enriched through racketeering activity." Id.
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B. Organized Crime
The first inquiry in exploring the effect of the investment injury requirement
on organized crime cases is whether there is any significance in restricting or
expanding the availability of such suits. Because cases filed against organized
crime figures are rare or even nonexistent, there does not appear to be a class
of cases to restrict.2 6
7
Nevertheless, the section 1962(a) investment injury requirement would still
leave a conceivable class of claims involving organized crime. The infiltration
of other businesses by organized criminals would violate section 1962(c) de-
spite the person/enterprise distinction. The person-an organized crimi-
nal-and the enterprise-the business-would be distinct entities leaving the
criminal exposed to section 1962(c) liability.
The effect of the investment injury requirement cases on suits against organ-
ized crime figures may be, as a practical matter, irrelevant. Nonetheless, a
conceivable class of section 1962(c) cases would remain for plaintiffs who
muster the courage to use it.
C. Alleging Internal-Investment Injury
One factor may diminish the impact of the investment injury requirement.
A section 1962(a) plaintiff may have the ability to allege injury resulting from
predicate acts made possible by the defendant's internal investment or use of
the proceeds of prior predicate acts.
Authority exists supporting the viability of this kind of section 1962(a) alle-
gation.2 68 The success of these allegations, however, would be an exception.
Establishing the requisite causation would be an often insurmountable task."
Nonetheless, these cases would fit within the investment injury requirement
and not violate the language of the statute.
CONCLUSION
RICO is a statute immersed in controversy. The breadth of civil RICO has
been a focal point of that controversy. The judiciary's response to that breadth
has created a controversy of its own over whether the judicial limits on RICO
are warranted.
The investment injury requirement is the latest in a line of limits on civil
RICO. Opponents of the requirement read the language as rejecting it, and
point to legislative history and Supreme Court precedent to bolster their posi-
tion. Proponents of the requirement read the statute as prescribing the limit,
and bring their own interpretation of legislative history and Supreme Court
267. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (noting that civil RICO has rarely, if ever,
been used against a traditional organized crime figure).
268. See supra note 190 (explaining how an enterprise's investment in itself and subsequent
acts of fraud can yield section 1962(a) liability for the fraud).
269. See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text (explaining one court's view of the limiting
effect of the investment injury requirement).
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precedent to the debate. The plain language of the RICO statute, however,
requires investment injury in section 1962(a) actions, and that should control.
Those who have urged a broad application of RICO have lived by plain-
language readings of the statute and now may die by one. Plain-language
readings have protected RICO from artificial judicial limitations and now a
plain language reading may legitimately limit the reach of RICO. The invest-
ment injury requirement eliminates much of a controversial class of cases
while respecting the language of RICO.
The influx of mail and wire fraud cases brought under RICO against corpo-
rate entities may be reduced by application of the investment injury require-
ment. To many, this is a welcome result. To others, this is a tragedy. The
result, however, is drawn from the text, and is thus available to courts seeking
a limit that comports with the language of the statute.
Patrick D. Hughes
